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SEQUENTIAL DOMINATION, AUTONOMY 

AND LIVING WILLS 

SANDRA H. JOHNSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Jay Katz presents a rich and detailed portrait of the doctor-pa­
tient relationship that resembles Degas' Absinthe. In Degas' portrait, 
as in Katz's, the two parties find themselves in a relationship that each 
joined consensually although from some sense of necessity. Now en­
gaged in the object of their mutual choice or need, however, they sit as 
isolated individuals, gazing away from each other, not touching, silent. 
Degas leaves us to speculate as to the forces that brought his 
couple together at the cafe and those that keep them apart. I The 
power of Katz's work in The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 2 is 
that he not only presents the human costs of the frustrated relation­
ship but also identifies precisely the barriers that have confined pa­
tients and doctors within so unsatisfactory a world. In so doing, Katz 
has revealed not only the tradition of silence of the medical profession­
als but also the patients' fear of conversation as dual causes of the 
failure of communication. These obstacles are more than historical, 
although their long existence contributes to their continuing strength. 
They are nourished by the continuing professional domination of the 
patient-physician relationship and by the resultant distrust of physi­
cians by their patients (pp. 95-103). Katz presents an insightful analy­
sis of the role of law in confirming, rather than reordering, the 
hierarchical domination of physicians over patients. Thus, Katz con­
tradicts a not uncommon perception of law as libertarian in compari­
• Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law and Assistant Professor of 
Law in Internal Medicine, St. Louis University School of Medicine; A.B., St. Louis Univer­
sity, 1973; J.D., New York University, 1976; LL.M., Yale Law School, 1977. I gratefully 
acknowledge the assistance of my colleague Carolyn Jones who reviewed previous drafts of 
this essay. 
I. Although the display of Absinthe caused a scandal in London in 1893 because it 
was viewed as portraying a prostitute seated in a cafe with her customer, the painting could 
easily be interpreted as a portrayal of any breached relationship including that of a long­
married couple who have separated psychologically from each other. 
2. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) [hereinafter 
KATZ]. 
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son with the paternalistic ideals of medicine. Although, as Katz notes, 
"Anglo-American law has, at least in theory, a long-standing tradition 
of preferring liberty over custody" (p. 2), when confronted with the 
conflict between liberty and custody in informed consent, judges 
"fashion[ed] a doctrine of informed consent that has secured for pa­
tients the right to better custody but not to liberty-the right to choose 
how to be treated" (p. 49). 
Although the patients apparently won the battle between liberty 
and custody in the doctor-patient relationship through recognition of 
the requirement of informed consent, that victory is only illusory, ac­
cording to Katz. Such apparent victories will continue to disguise de­
feat so long as the legal doctrines or procedures continue to rest upon 
the fallacy that patients can have autonomy over treatment decisions 
absent a radical reordering of the patient-physician relationship: 
"Challenging the long-standing tradition of silence requires nothing 
less than uprooting the prevailing authoritarian value and belief sys­
tems and replacing them with more egalitarian ones" (p. 28). Because 
the current hierarchical patient-physician relationship rests on both an 
overestimation of professional expertise and an underestimation of pa­
tients' capacity for autonomy, a fundamental change in the nature of 
this relationship requires change on both sides. 
Law will continue to confirm the domination of patients by doc­
tors unless the courts and the legislatures become aware that facially 
neutral legal mechanisms often enhance professional authority at the 
expense of personal autonomy. Absent this awareness, patients will 
continue to be betrayed by illusory victories in their battles for auton­
omy over medical decisionmaking. 
The validity of Katz's thesis concerning the role of law in con­
firming the traditional structure of the doctor-patient relationship and 
its impact on patients' autonomy is borne out in its application to leg­
islation concerning decisions about death and dying. The living-will 
statutes, which, aside from the guardianship, are the most common 
legislation on the refusal of life-sustaining treatment by adults,3 explic­
3. Living-will legislation had been adopted by 38 states and the District of Columbia 
as of January 1987. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-l to -10 (1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010­
.100 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 
1986); 1985 Conn. Acts 606 §§ 1-6 (Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 
(1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2321 to -2430 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 
(Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327(D)-1 to 
-27 (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to 4508 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 
§§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (West Supp. 
1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.I-.11 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 
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itly elevate the choice of the individual to primacy in the competition 
for control over these medical treatment decisions.4 The living-will 
legislation thus promises patients control over their own medical treat­
ment as well as a shield against professional domination. These may 
be empty promises. The living-will legislation is hampered in achiev­
ing its goal of securing autonomy for patients in a large number of 
cases because its structure treats as inevitable the domination of the 
professional over the patient and "protects" the patient from conversa­
tion, to use Katz's term, that may actually enhance the patient's 
autonomy. 
Rather than treating patients and physicians as coparticipants in 
an effort to evaluate alternatives, this legislation assumes a patient­
physician relationship of sequential domination, in which first the doc­
tor and then the patient dominates and controls the decisionmaking to 
the exclusion of the other. Thus, it affirms rather than challenges the 
long-standing tradition of silence. It is important to examine the liv­
ing-willlegislation from this perspective because such an analysis calls 
into question facile exhortations to physicians and patients that they 
use the living will as an opportunity to communicate with one an­
otherS and because it reveals the subtle, but significant, risks hidden in 
the structure of this very popular mechanism.6 
101 to 109 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1986); ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (West Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 
to -614 (Michie Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1986); Mo. 
REV. STAT. §§ 495.010-055 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 
I
(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:2 to 16 
(Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1981 & Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 97.050-.090 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §§ 3102-3111 (West Supp. 1987); OR. 
REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1985); S.c. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op 
1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1986); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 
art. 4590(h) (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -117 (Supp. 1986); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262, tit. 13, § 1801 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE §§ 54­
325.8:1 to :13 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (WestSupp. 
1986); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West Supp. 
1986); WYo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp. 1986). In comparison, less than a dozen 
states had adopted statutes authorizing medical agents. See infra note 54. 
4. For example, several statutes provide that adult persons have "the fundamental 
right to control the decisions" relating to their own medical care. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-2 
(1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.02 (West Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 39-4502 (1985); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28.101 (1985). 
5. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.055(4) (Vernon Supp. 1986), which provides 
"[c]ommunication regarding treatment decisions among patients, the families and physi­
cians is encouraged." See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.02 (West Supp. 1986). 
6. "One New York group has distributed millions of living wills. The columnist who 
writes 'Dear Abby' reports receiving tens of thousands of requests for copies each time she 
deals with the subject." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL 
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At its best, the living will protects personal choice against profes­
sional - both legal and medical- interference. The living will affirms 
the central value of the individual patient as both the subject-object 
and ultimate arbiter of his or her own treatment decisions. The living 
will may allow to be done what ought to be done by providing the 
comfort of written documentation of the patients' desires at a time 
when they can no longer speak for themselves. At its worst, however, 
the living will, now available in a convenient "permanent mini-will 
version ... in [a] new credit-card size,"7 reduces a sometimes complex 
judgment to a slogan: No machines! 
The apparent simplicity of the living will conceals the real oppor­
tunities for misunderstanding and the range of discrete decisions that 
often must be made. For example, a hospital recently described a situ­
ation in which a doctor brought the living wills of two young and 
healthy men to be "put on file" in the emergency room so that they 
would not be resuscitated should they suffer heart failure at the hospi­
tal from injuries incurred in an automobile accident or some other 
event. When the hospital called these men, they were shocked at what 
the doctor had done. 
The widely circulated mini-will provides: "If there is no reason­
able expectation of my recovery from extreme physical or mental disa­
bility . . . I direct that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by 
artificial means and heroic measures."8 Which "extreme physical dis­
abilities" does this cover? Burns? If so, how severe? Quadriplegia? 
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO 
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL AND 
LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONMAKING 140 (1983). 
7. The mini-will is available from Concern for Dying and is provided in appreciation 
for a contribution to the organization. 
8. See supra note 7. This language is not representative of language used in the sam­
ple living wills offered in the state statutes. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. 54-325.8:4 (Supp. 
1986): 
Declaration made this day of (month, year). I, 
________, willfully and voluntarily make known my desire that my dying 
shall not be artificially prolonged under the circumstances set forth below, and do hereby 
declare: 
If at any time I should have a terminal condition and my attending physician has 
determined that there can be no recovery from such condition and my death is imminent, 
where the application of life-prolonging procedures would serve only to artificially prolong 
the dying process, I direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be 
permitted to die naturally with only the administration of medication or the performance of 
any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide me with comfort care or to alleviate 
pain. 
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such life-prolonging 
procedures, it is my intention that this declaration shall be honored by my family and 
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Amputation? Of what particular limbs? Blindness? What means are 
artificial? This is not to say that individuals should be barred from 
making treatment decisions, including refusals of treatment, in these 
situations. Rather, these decisions, if not made in an emergency situa­
tion, usually would require more information and reflection than a 
quick-and~easy very general document requires. If the treatment deci­
sion must be made in an emergency situation, a preference in favor of 
treatment at least to stabilize the patient, restoring the capacity for 
decisionmaking, would ordinarily prevail. 
If the importance of the document is that it reveals an individ­
ual's personal values as pro-refusal or pro-treatment, it is not so much 
an exercise of autonomy as it is a labelling. As a label for the informa­
tion of persons who actually must make treatment decisions on behalf 
of the patient, it does not operate in the automatic or "binding" man­
ner that the public perceives. Nor does the simple label or value 
choice necessarily identify a single correct decision among available 
options in particular circumstances. 
This essay begins with a consideration of the context of the living 
will and its part in the process through which society is developing a 
series of resolutions to claims for autonomy in regard to medical treat­
ment. The context of the legislation sets the stage for an examination 
of its structure, using Katz's analysis of informed consent as a model. 
physician as the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment 
and accept the consequences of such refusal. 
I understand the full import of this declaration and I am emotionally and mentally 
competent to make this declaration ... 
________.(Signed). 
See also Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.015(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986): 
DECLARAnON 
I have the primary right to make my own decisions concerning treatment that might 
unduly prolong the dying process. By this declaration I express to my physician, family 
and friends my intent. If I should have a terminal condition it is my desire that my dying 
not be prolonged by administration of death-prolonging procedures. If my condition is 
terminal and I am unable to participate in decisions regarding my medical treatment, I 
direct my attending physician to withhold or withdraw medical procedures that merely 
prolong the dying process and are not necessary to my comfort or to alleviate pain. It is 
not my intent to authorize affirmative or deliberate acts or omissions to shorten my life 
rather only to permit the natural process of dying. 
Signed this day of ________ 
Signature.________ 
City, County and State of residence________ 
Most of the living-will statutes do not require that the language of the statutory sample be 
used and do not make invalid documents that fail to use the statutory language, although 
the statutes do provide for severance of invalid clauses. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. 54­
325.8:4 (Supp. 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.015(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986). Severalorgani­
zations have distributed living wills, including the Catholic Health Association. 
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The statutory structure reveals an overbroad deference to professional 
discretion and a misconception of autonomy as control that undercut 
the statutes' protection of patient autonomy. The essay assesses the 
likelihood that physicians and patients will succumb to the superficial 
attractions of silence and insulation so readily available in the struc­
ture of the living will. In its conclusion, the essay offers suggestions 
for improving the lot of physicians and patients within the confines of 
the decisions involved. 
I. THE CALL FOR LEGISLATION 
The living will is an expression of the drive for autonomy and 
individual control as against professional dominance over decisions re­
garding medical treatment. The popularity of the living wills and the 
legislation legitimizing these documents indicate the depth and 
breadth of the demand for individual control and the rejection of the 
"professionalization" of death.9 The legislation also manifests a rebel­
lion against the "tyranny of technology" 10 and the dread of technol­
ogy controlled by others. It responds to the primal fear of premature 
burial in which one hovers in a physical limbo between life and death 
(or afterlife) entrapped, not by a coffin, but by "machinery" that one is 
helpless to release. It also stems from the anxiety, particularly com­
mon among the elderly, over the expense involved in dying an "artifi­
cially" prolonged death. The living will offers a shield against the 
psychological nakedness that is demanded in judicial procedures that 
examine the previously expressed and unexpressed desires of the now­
incompetent patient and the motives of family members who seek offi­
cial permission to stop treatment. 
The living will substitutes for these fears the image of control by 
the individual rather than professionals. Individual control is particu­
larly appealing here. It reflects the personal nature of a decision on 
the use of medical treatment, especially when such treatment presents 
both harm and benefit (p. 94). The characterization of treatment and 
9. Professional control of death is supported by a claim to special expertise on the 
part of medical or legal procedures. The reach of the professionalization of death is evident 
in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. BJudworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1983) in which the court speaks of the financial and emotional drain suffered by the 
family "awaiting the medico-legal death of a loved one." [d. at 618 (emphasis added). 
10. Of course, technology cannot itself tyrannize human beings, as it remains incapa­
ble of so human an action. The sense of the tyranny of technology, however, is more than 
anthropomorphic; rather, it expresses as well the domination of the expert, armed with the 
power of technological expertise, over the individual who is the subject of the treatment. 
Veatch, Autonomy's Temporary Triumph, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 38. 
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its results as either harmful or beneficial is dependent upon the indi­
vidual's values. The impossibility of characterizing the result in many 
cases without an understanding of the individual's perspective is evi­
dent in the basic question of whether the result of "more life" or pro­
longing life is valuable or detrimental to a particular person. Whether 
a longer life is a harm or a benefit depends upon the individual's evalu­
ation of the nature of that time. What is likely to enter that evalua­
tion, depending upon the individual involved, is whether the extension 
promised by certain treatments will be an extension of suffering, of 
ability or inability to interact with friends and family, or of "this" life, 
barring passage to the "next." 
Deference to individual control is attractive as well, however, be­
cause it is compatible with the values given primacy in what has been 
described as an age of social freedom. II A high degree of deference to 
individual moral choices may lead to claims for "protection" from 
participation, or interference, by others in the process by which the 
choices are made. This protection from others during the decision­
making process itself reflects the skepticism of the authority or persua­
siveness of moral reasoning that has characterized this age of 
individual freedom.12 Reliance on personal choice allows the institu­
tions that sanction particular choices to claim that it is not they who 
decided to remove life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent pa­
tient. Rather, the institutions - whether they be the courts, the legi.s­
lature, the hospitals, the doctors or the family - are merely media for 
the expression of the desires and wishes of the only apparently silent 
patient. 
Although decisions to discontinue or continue treatment for par­
ticular patients are made in a variety of forums, the most public of 
these has been the courts. In many cases, the concept of autonomy, 
identified by the courts as an appropriate decisionmaking base and em­
bodied in substituted judgment, operates as described. The institution 
is merely a means through which the silent patients exercise choices 
once it is discovered through an examination of their previously ex­
pressed or implied desires. \3 When the patient has never been capable 
II. See Capron, Ironies and Tensions in Feeding the Dying, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Oct. 1984, at 32. 
12. See generally Callahan, Autonomy: A Moral Good, Not a Moral Obsession, HAS­
TINGS CENTER REP.. , Oct. 1984, at 40. 
13. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 747, 
751-52,370 N.E.2d 417, 428, 431 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,70,355 A.2d 647, 663 
(1976); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 470-75, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 546-47 (App. Div. 1980); 
In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 131-32, 660 P.2d 738, 748 (1983). 
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of exercising judgment on his or her own behalf,14 however, the right 
of self-determination is only poorly served by reference to substituted 
judgment, if at all. 15 In these latter situations, the personal choice ra­
tionale is a sham. Such dishonesty provides dangerous comfort. 
Although a "best interest" approach has its own deficiencies, reliance 
on substituted judgment in these latter cases does nothing to remedy 
the problems. 
The courts have been troubled not only by the question of how a 
decision to withdraw or withhold medical treatment is to be made, but 
whether that decision is permissible and falls within appropriate 
boundaries of individual choice. 16 Because of their sense of frontier 
policymaking, judges have repeatedly called upon the legislatures to 
determine the appropriate boundaries. 17 Courts have described the 
legislature as better suited for this task because the legislature can take 
a broad view, can consider a variety of scenarios, and can utilize ex­
pertise. ls Several courts have commended the task to the legislature 
because the legislature can weigh competing views and is a more 
majoritarian decisionmaker. 19 The expectations of the courts for legis­
lative relief, however, will not be met for several reasons. 
First, the state legislatures will not deal with the hard cases. The 
living-will legislation has been the single response of most state legisla­
tures to the question of discontinuation of life-sustaining medical 
14. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 751-52, 370 N.E.2d at 428-30. 
15. Capron, supra note 11, at 32. 
16. See, e.g., Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. \038, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Quinlan, 
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647. 
17. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980) ("[I]t is the type 
issue [sic] which is more suitably addressed in the legislative forum, where fact finding can 
be less confined and the viewpoints of all interested institutions ... can be presented and 
synthesized."); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 344,486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (\985) ("Legislature is 
better able than any other single institution to reflect the social values at stake"); Colyer, 99 
Wash. 2d at 139, 660 P.2d at 752 ("as these issues necessarily involve society's moral stan­
dards as well as legal and medical issues, the Legislature is the most capable of assessing the 
views of the people of this state"). 
18. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 370, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67 (1981) ("Unlike the 
Legislature, the courts are neither equipped nor empowered to proscribe substantive or 
procedural rules ...."). See also Satz, 379 So. 2d at 360. 
19. See, e.g., Conroy, 98 N.J. at 344, 486 A.2d at 1220, which states: 
Perhaps it would be best if the Legislature formulated clear standards for resolv­
ing requests to terminate life-sustaining treatment for incompetent patients. As 
an elected body, the Legislature is better able than any other single institution to 
reflect the social values at stake. In addition, it has the resources and ability to 
synthesize vast quantities of data and opinions from a variety of fields and to 
formulate general guidelines that may be applicable to a broad range of situations. 
See also Satz, 379 So. 2d 359, 360; John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 
432 So. 2d 611, 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Satz, 379 So. 2d at 360). 
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treatment,20 This instrument requires that the patient be competent at 
the time of the execution of the documenVI The legislatures thus fail 
to provide any answers for the Saikewicz cases in which the silent pa­
tient has never been competent to indicate a choice and in which the 
limitations of the substituted judgment analysis as simple fact finding 
are most clear. Nor have the legislatures been decisive in handling the 
most recent of the difficult treatment decisions - the question of the 
appropriateness of discontinuing nutrition when provided by medical 
means.22 
Second, the living-will legislation has not reached very broadly 
among possible treatment decisions. The living-will statutes typically 
confine the declaration to cases in which the patient is terminally ill 
and to treatments that are ineffective in remedying the patient's fatal 
illness or condition.23 Thus confined, the living-will legislation gov­
erns only that individual decision that is most easily perceived as ra­
tional: the decision to refuse medical treatments that offer no chance 
of cure. In fact, a choice to pursue medical treatments that prolong 
the dying process of an individual who is incompetent24 might popu­
larly be viewed as irrational because of the emphasis on interaction, 
choice, and thought as a measure of humanness. 
Third, the limitation of the legislation to situations in which the 
patient is terminally ill and has expressed his or her choice of treat­
ment reflects the inclination of state legislatures to be reactive rather 
20. See supra note 3. 
21. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502(a) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 765.04(1) (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-1 (1985); Mo. REV. STAT. 
§ 459.025 (Vernon Supp. 1986); but see, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3803 (Supp. 1986), which 
provides, "[i)f any person is a minor or an adult who is physically or mentally unable to 
execute or is otherwise incapacitated from executing" the document, it may be executed by 
the parent of a minor or the legal guardian of the declarant. 
22. Several statutes exclude nutrition from the definition of procedures that may be 
refused through a living will. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(b) (West Supp. 1986); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5) (1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.015(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5)(b) (West Supp. 1986); and WYO. STAT. § 33-26-144(a) (iii) 
(Supp. 1986). Indiana excludes "the provision of appropriate nutrition and hydration." 
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-4 (Burns Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). These provisions 
should not be read to extend beyond the living will and to prohibit the withdrawal of 
medically provided nutrition in all circumstances. See, e.g., Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 
So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
23. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(3) (1984); IDAHO CODE § 39-4503(4) (1985); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, \o2(c) (1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.025 (Vernon Supp. 1986). 
24. Many of the living-will statutes confine their effectiveness to patients who were 
competent at the time they executed the document but who are incompetent at the time 
the treatment decision must be made. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (1985); Mo. REV. 
STAT. § 459.025 (Vernon SUpp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-\03(1) (1986). 
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than leading in sensitive areas. By the time most of the state legisla­
tures finally acted, the courts had already established that the termi­
nally ill, once-competent patient who had expressed a clear choice to 
refuse life-sustaining treatments was well within the bounds of accept­
able deference to the individuaJ.25 Rather than identify the outer 
boundaries of individual choice, the legislatures merely acted within 
the framework that the courts had established. Of course, if the living 
will is seen as simply giving legislative approval to an extra-judicial 
procedure for the refusal of treatment, it does relieve the courts of 
"easy" cases they might otherwise have to decide and does protect 
families and others from judicial proceedings that offer no benefit to 
the patient. The legislation, however, still demonstrates the unwilling­
ness or inability of legislatures to relieve the courts of establishing ap­
propriate boundaries. 
Still, many courts have looked to the legislatures for a better or 
more legitimate solution than the courts are able to provide.26 These 
courts attribute to the legislatures a level of expertise and analysis that 
generally is not reflected in the reality of legislative practice on the 
state leveJ.27 Legislatures do not always listen to the experts, arbitrate 
the disputes, and come to a decision. Rather, the process is often one 
of political compromise. Some courts implicitly have recognized the 
compromising nature of the legislative process in their identification of 
the majoritarian nature of legislatures.28 
Precisely because the legislatures reflect the rule of the majority, 
however, deference to the legislature for boundary-setting may be in­
appropriate. Autonomy is a value that protects the individual from 
the majority;29 thus, the view of the majority should not be the final 
determinant of the boundaries of individual choice, although the ten­
sion between the role of the individual and the role of society in the 
area of privacy has never been adequately resolved. To the extent that 
the right to refuse medical treatment is based on a constitutional right 
to privacy,3D the legislature cannot redefine or narrow that right be­
yond constitutional requirements, whatever they might be. At the 
25. Thirteen ofthe thirty-five states with living will legislation enacted the statutes in 
1985. Otten, New "Wills" Allow People to Reject Prolonging ofLife in Fatal Illness, Wall 
St. J., July 2, 1985, at 35, col. 4. 
26. See supra note 17. 
27. See supra note 19. 
28. See supra note 19. 
29. Callahan, supra note 12, at 40. 
30. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743, 
379 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,40,355 A.2d 647,663 (1976); In re 
Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 290, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (1978). 
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least, the courts retain the responsibility to review the legislative ac­
tion in light of the demands of the constitutional norm. 31 
Legislation that has been drafted or influenced by the experts in 
the field will bear an expert's mark, and the legislative solution may 
rest upon assumptions concerning the authority of experts. The re­
sulting structure of the legislation may then reflect traditional expert­
layman relationships, reflecting the public's love-hate relationship with 
professionals in which laymen are fearful of contradicting professional 
expertise but resentful of professional control (p. 144). This ambiva­
lence toward professional control, coupled with the competing claims 
of the professions and popular demand for individual control, sets the 
stage for compromise in the living-will legislation. The key compro­
mise is evidenced in the typical living-will statute's structure that has 
doctors and patients taking turns at controlling critical decisions, es­
tablishing a relationship of sequential domination. 32 
II. THE REALM OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT 
In an early article on Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. University 
Board of Trustees,33 Katz attributed the failure of the doctrine of in­
formed consent to the fact that "in delegating unspecified discretion to 
the medical profession to make judgments about patients' self-determi­
nation, the court did not appreciate the futility of its endeavors, for it 
gave an undefined task to a group that had neither the experience nor 
the commitment to self-determination" (p. 62). Although his later dis­
covery of an amicus brief submitted to the Salgo court by the Ameri­
can College of Surgeons caused him to recast the actors in his analysis, 
Katz still argues that "only self-conscious reflection can make it clear 
that such contradictory intentions as 'full disclosure of facts' and 
'[professional] discretion' are reconcilable only in the kingdom of 
dreams" (p. 63). The strong, unrestricted affirmation of patient auton­
31. Capron discusses the negative implications of resting the right to refuse treat­
ment on constitutional grounds rather than upon tort and contract. Capron, Borrowed 
Lessons: The Role of Ethical Distinctions in Framing Law on Life-Sustaining Treatment, 
1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 647, 657-58 [hereinafter Capron, Borrowed Lessons]. See also Dinino 
v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 327, 684 P.2d 1297 (1984). In Dinino the Washington Supreme 
Court considered a claim that the state's living-will statute violated Dinino's constitutional 
right to privacy because it suspended the effect of the living will during pregnancy. The 
court held that the claim was not justiciable because the plaintiff was "neither pregnant nor 
suffering from a terminal condition." Id. at 331, 684 P.2d at 1300. It thus reversed the 
lower court's holding that the provision was unconstitutional. 
32. See supra text at p. 115. 
33. Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 137 
(1977). 
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omy that underlies informed consent theory and that appears in the 
landmark cases34 was abandoned in the structure of the doctrine of 
informed consent as it finally emerged (pp. 80-92). The courts aban­
doned their promise, according to Katz, when they deferred to profes­
sional discretion and control the selection of the information that 
should be given to the patients concerning particular treatments (p. 
69).35 Although there were many motives for deference to profession­
als, including a concern for the physician's economic well-being, a pri­
mary rationale was the perceived necessity of relying on professional 
wisdom and knowledge in medical decisionmaking. The living-will 
legislation offers only an illusory triumph for autonomy because it 
similarly defers to professional judgment both inappropriately and too 
completely, at a point critical to the effectiveness of the claim of 
autonomy. 
The living-will legislation generally confines the effect of a living 
will to situations in which the patient is terminally ill and in which the 
available treatments only prolong the dying process. 36 The statutes 
generally defer to professional judgment the determination that a pa­
tient's condition and treatment options fall within these limitations. 
The living-will statutes vary in the treatment limits established 
for the operation of the document. As previously noted, several living­
will statutes exempt medical procedures to provide nutrition and hy­
dration from the medical treatments which the living will may con­
trol. 37 This exclusion has more to do with legislative compromise and 
judgment than physician dominance.38 Other treatment-centered pre­
34. See KATZ, supra note 2, at 60-80, (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 
784 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 154 Cal. 
App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957), Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 
(1960». 
35. Katz also discusses other implications of the court's choice of negligence law, 
rather than battery, for informed consent cases. These implications include the failure of 
damages to remedy dignitary injuries standing alone. 
36. See, e.g., Adams & Adams, An Overview of Georgia's Living Will Legislation, 36 
MERCER L. REV. 45-55 (1984); Note, To Die or Not to Die: The New York Legislature 
Ponders a Natural Death Act, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 650-63 (1985); Comment, 
Changing Attitudes in Florida's "Right to Die" Law, 14 STETSON L. REV. 375, 381-84 
(1985). 
37. See supra note 22. 
38. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, for example, in November, 1984, 
issued Guidelines for Legislation on Life-Sustaining Treatment, which generally supported 
living-will legislation, but maintained that nutrition and hydration should not be included 
among life-sustaining treatments that may be refused through use of the document. This 
does not indicate that Catholic doctrine categorically opposes the withdrawal of nutrition 
or hydration in all circumstances. See, e.g., McCartney, Catholic Positions on Withholding 
Sustenance for the Terminally Ill, HEALTH PROGRESS, Oct. 1986, at 38. The Judicial 
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conditions, however, do indicate a misplaced reliance on professional 
expertise. The Arkansas statute, for example, provides that only treat­
ments that the doctor finds "extraordinary" may be refused through a 
living will. 39 The weighing of harm and benefit involved in a conclu­
sion as to whether a treatment is extraordinary is clearly a patient's 
and not a professional's task. As Katz observes, "[t]he weighing of 
benefit and harm, which are intentioned and dependent on individual 
preferences, can only be carried out by patients with the assistance of 
their physicians. It cannot be assigned solely to physicians no matter 
how pure their altruistic intent" (p. 94). 
In addition to treatment limitations, however, most living-will 
statutes confine the operation of a living will to patients whose condi­
tions meet a particular statutory definition of terminal illness.4O These 
definitions suffer from several conceptual flaws that flow both from 
inappropriate deference to the medical profession and from a lack of 
clarity in the role of the status of terminal illness as a limit on individ­
ual choice. The Missouri and Indiana statutes, for example, provide 
that the living will is effective only when a physician finds that the 
patient's death will occur within a "short time" whether or not avail­
able treatments are provided.41 Montana requires that a terminal con­
dition is one which "will, in the opinion of the attending physician, 
result in death within a relatively short time."42 This definition gives 
to the physician authority to answer a question that is not entirely a 
matter of professional judgment. An individual's evaluation of a pe-
Council of the American Medical Association decided unanimously at its meeting in 
March, 1986, that even if death was not imminent, it "would be ethical for doctors to 
withhold 'all means of life prolonging medical treatment,' including food and water, from 
patients in irreversible comas ...." Reassessing Care ofDying, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1986, 
at B7, col. I. See also, Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 440 n.38, 497 
N.E.2d 626, 638-39 n.38 (1986) ("The A.M.A.'s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs' 
position allows the withdrawal of life-prolonging medical treatment including 'medication 
and artificially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration.' " (quoting 
A.M.A.'s statement titled: "Withholding or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treat­
ment" (March IS, 1986)), quoted in, Rasmussen v. Fleming, No.2 CA Civ. 5622, slip. op. 
at 11-12 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 25, 1986). 
39. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801-3802 (Supp. 1986). See also MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 41-41-103(b) (1984) which provides: "Withdrawal of life sustaining mechanisms shall 
mean the cessation of use of extraordinary techniques and applications, including mechani­
cal devices, which prolong life through artificial means." 
40. See infra notes 41-42. 
41. Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010(6) (Vernon Supp. 1986): A terminal condition is "an 
incurable or irreversible condition which, in the opinion of the attending physician is such 
that death will occur within a short time regardless of the application of medical proce­
dures." See also IND. CODE ANN. § 50-9-102 (1985). 
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-102 (1985) (emphasis added). 
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riod of time as "short" depends on the goals and values of that individ­
ual. The same objective time frame can be perceived as either short or 
long, depending on sUbjective factors such as the presence or absence 
of pain. 
Other living-will statutes attempt to define a terminally ill patient 
as one who, in the opinion of the physician, will die within a particular 
period of time.43 Wisconsin, for example, specifies that a terminal 
condition is one "that reasonable medical judgment finds would cause 
death within thirty days."44 Asking such a question of a physician as 
if there were always an answer ignores the real presence of uncertainty 
in medical decisionmaking (pp. 165-206). Should a "good doctor" 
take the rule of the statute seriously and refuse to certify someone as 
terminally ill when he is unable to render a professional judgment with 
any reasonable certainty concerning the number of days remaining for 
his patient? What level of certainty or probability is acceptable? Is 
the acceptable level of certainty or probability also a question that 
must be deferred to the doctors? Or should the "good doctor" simply 
play the game established by the statute and certify the patient as ter­
minally ill when, in the doctor's opinion, or the patient's, further treat­
ment is undesirable? 
Further, it is not uncommon that treatments present a probability 
of benefit or "cure" rather than a guarantee of either success or failure. 
In the face of this uncertainty, a broader role for the patient in the 
determination of the preconditions for operation of the living will is 
essential. Although not self-evident, the determination of the presence 
of terminal illness is itself a question that involves an assessment of 
risk and a balancing of the benefits and burdens of treatment that 
might reduce that risk. If the patient has a particular cancer that re­
sponds to chemotherapy fifty percent of the time, should the patient be 
considered terminally ill and the patient's living will be understood as 
43. See also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 363,486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (1985), which used 
a predicted one-year lifespan as a limit on compliance with refusal of medically provided 
nutrition. In a New York Times article on post-Conroy treatment of patients, the 
Ombudsman charged with the task of initially deciding whether to allow removal of medi­
cally provided nutrition from nursing home patients, denied approval in the first case 
brought to him because it was not clear that death would occur within one year, as the 
Conroy court required. The patient was in an irreversible coma and had clearly indicated 
previously her desire not to be maintained in a vegetative state. Although three physicians 
testified that she had less than a year to live, two physicians appointed by the Ombudsman 
concluded that the patient could live for years. The Ombudsman concluded that "medical 
experts find it impossible to state with authority that [the patient] will die within a year." 
Ombudsman Bars Food-Tube Removal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at B2, col. 1. See infra 
note 46. 
44. WIse. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(8) (West Supp. 1986). 
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a refusal of this treatment? If the treatment is successful twenty-five 
percent of the time? Less than ten percent? These questions cannot be 
answered by medical expertise alone. Statutes that give doctors con­
trol over the determination of whether a patient is terminally ill often 
inappropriately defer to professional judgment mixed questions of ex­
pertise and personal values. 
The statutory treatment of "terminal illness" as though it were 
solely a question of fact also ignores the lack of agreement concerning 
the purpose or validity of some notion of terminal illness as a limit on 
the patient's right to choose to refuse treatment.45 Does the patient 
with end-stage renal disease who refuses hemodialysis fall within the 
limit? The patient receiving nutrition through a gastrostomy tube due 
to permanent dysfunction of the esophagus? The patient in the early 
stages of a slowly progressing terminal cancer who develops pneumo­
nia and refuses antibiotics? A very elderly patient suffering from a 
confluence of chronic diseases that may include diabetes, heart disease 
and progressive kidney failure? These patients will die sooner rather 
than later if the treatments they refuse are not given. Is it the nature 
of the disease or illness that creates the boundaries on choice? Should 
the boundaries be the same for competent patients as for incompetent 
patients? If terminal illness is chosen as a boundary on the individual 
choice of the incompetent patient, what function is that boundary 
serving? 
The legislatures have failed to confront a critical issue in the pro­
cess of establishing boundaries on the choice to refuse treatment. 46 
45. Some of the confusion regarding the role of terminal illness as a boundary on the 
right to refuse treatment may arise from the mistaken placement of this right under the 
same analytical scheme as the right to choose abortion. Capron analyzes the differences 
between the choice of abortion and the choice to refuse treatment. He concludes that the 
right to refuse treatment based on 
the right of privacy is the same for all patients; it does not grow or diminish 
depending on the patient's condition. For example, a competent patient with can­
cer who decided to discontinue the chemotherapy believed by his physicians to 
offer his only hope of overcoming an otherwise fatal disease would be exercising 
his right of privacy - that is, his authority to decide whether to accept or reject 
medical interventions. There should be no suggestion in the law that a patient's 
right to make this choice only arises when he or she becomes permanently uncon­
scious or is near death despite medicine's best efforts to prolong life. 
Capron, Borrowed Lessons, supra note 31, at 658. 
46. Several courts have acted in what may be called a "legislative capacity" in de­
signing detailed procedures for the legitimization of decisions by patients in the future to 
refuse treatment. The New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Conroy is a recent example. 
In acting "legislatively" this court set as a boundary a requirement that the death of the 
incompetent nursing home patient, who may have previously indicated a refusal of life­
prolonging treatments and for whom the question of whether to provide nutrition medi­
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They have tried to avoid the complex issue of the relationship of the 
individual and society in regard to refusal of treatment. Although the 
statutes repeat the now familiar refrain that the individual's right of 
self-determination is limited by the state's interests in life and medical 
ethics, they do not explore these limitations. The exploration of these 
boundaries within the legal system remains for the courts. 
Deferring to the medical profession the question of whether a par­
ticular individual is terminally ill thus allows the professional's values 
to dominate: "Just as patients bring different values to bear on their 
ultimate choice, so do physicians, although doctors' value judgments 
are often obscured by their homogenizing all values under the single 
rubric of medical judgment" (p. 96). 
One cannot rely on the "good faith" of the physician in the appli­
cation of the indeterminate statutory language of the living-will legis­
lation to a particular situation (p. 94). Because there is "no one clear 
path to well-being," one cannot rely entirely on a presumed "identity 
of interests" between physician and patient to assist the living-will leg­
islation in its achievement of its goal of protecting individual control 
over medical treatment decisionmaking (p. xviii). If this is so, all that 
the legislatures have accomplished by enacting such legislation is to 
shift the final decisionmaking authority from one profession (as repre­
sented in the guardianship proceedings of the courts) to another (the 
physicians). Professional control over an individual's decision to re­
fuse medical treatment may remain practically unaltered by these 
statutes. 
III. THE REIGN OF INDIVIDUAL CONTROL 
Once the physician has established that the patient is within the 
limits that the statute allows the physician to determine, the individual 
has complete control over the decision to refuse treatment. This high 
degree of individual control grows out of the public's demands for a 
shield against professional domination. It may also be viewed as an 
effort to equalize the position of the patient as against the physician by 
granting the patient his or her own counterbalancing area of domina­
tion. Thus equally armed, the patient and the physician are then set 
upon each other to make decisions as best they can. 
Of course, autonomy is not subsumed completely by the concept 
of individual control. Individual control is at best a poor relative of 
cally has arisen, must be estimated to occur within one year. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 496 
A.2d at 1232. 
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autonomy but it is a tangible manifestation, and so becomes attractive 
in itself. The equation of autonomy with control may not be fair to the 
more sophisticated concept of autonomy in ethics. An awareness of 
the popular notion of autonomy, however, is important to an analysis 
of the likely impact of living wills upon the relationships of physicians 
and patients.47 To understand the impact of the substitution of indi­
vidual control for autonomy, a comparison of this truncated notion 
with Katz's more sophisticated analysis of autonomy is helpful. In 
contrast to the one-dimensional popular view of individual control, 
Katz separates autonomy into two dimensions: self-determination and 
autonomy. Katz defines self-determination as "the right of individuals 
to make their own decisions without interference from others" and 
defines autonomy as "psychological autonomy" which denotes "the 
capacities of persons to exercise the right to self-determination" (p. 
105). This separation supports Katz's attention to the individual's 
decisionmaking process and his call for a duty of reflection and for 
respectful dialogue. In contrast, the living-will statutes elevate docu­
mentation over conversation. They encourage individuals to make de­
cisions concerning refusal of treatment in the lawyer's office rather 
than the doctor's office, by filling out a form rather than engaging in 
open discussion with persons involved in the process. 
In some situations, for example when the living will is executed 
by a healthy individual in anticipation of the unpredictable, that may 
be the best that can be done. But in many situations, there are other, 
possibly more difficult, paths that may be taken. Simple refusal be­
comes the easier road, and true autonomy supported by reflection and 
conversation with other persons becomes the road less traveled. Giv­
ing each aspect of the decision (that is, ultimate sovereignty and exer­
cise of that sovereignty) equal stature strengthens claims of a right to 
exclude others from the process. 
The creation of a realm of individual control shielded from par­
ticipation by others ignores the widely held skepticism of the capacity 
of individuals to make their own medical decisions. This skepticism 
affects both physicians and patients. In anticipation of the perceived 
incapacity of patients, physicians may manipulate the boundaries of 
the arena in which patients may exercise their control. In anticipation 
47. "While it is not altogether fair to hold a good concept sensibly deployed to the 
test of its proof against popular misuse, concepts must always be used in some culture 
unless they are to remain solely in dictionaries and textbooks. How they react with that 
culture may tell us more about their inherent possibilities than any purely conceptual anal­
ysis could reveal." Callahan, supra note 12, at 41. 
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of their own weakness in the face of doctors' expertise, patients either 
may avoid necessary dialogue with their physicians or may defer en­
tirely to their physicians' judgment. Katz himself admits that "human 
psychological capacities for autonomy are limited ...." (p. 111). His 
solution to that limitation is not to ignore or to submit to it as living­
will legislation does, but to advocate "respectful conversation" that 
will enhance the autonomy of the patient. Katz eloquently defends his 
call to conversation and reflection as necessary to true autonomy. The 
need for conversation is especially acute in the particular types of deci­
sions over which the living will is to govern. 
The service of a living will upon the physician as a substitute for 
conversation will block the physician's understanding of the patient, 
which is itself essential to implementation of the patient's choices in 
the living will. If statutory terms such as "benefit" or "terminal condi­
tion" may be interpreted by the physician in a manner that respects 
the individual patient's values, the physician must have the opportu­
nity to understand how the patient perceives the situation and what 
the patient values in the portion of his or her life remaining. Further, 
most living-will statutes allow the patient to add clauses to the docu­
ment that may expand its scope considerably. For example, statutes 
that exclude nutrition from the definition of medical treatments that 
may be refused by means of a living will frequently would allow the 
patient to add a clause specifically refusing medically-provided nutri­
tion. These statutes, however, would not give the document its statu­
tory effect as to this clause.48 In these cases, the physician either could 
decide to abide by the patient's expressed wishes or could seek a judi­
cial order concerning the action. In either case, the physician's under­
standing of the reasons for or meaning of the patient's expression 
would be relevant and would increase the likelihood that the patient's 
choice would be understood and satisfied. 
If the living will has a broader impact on the nature of medical 
decision making and if its scope is expanded in practice, it will mute 
open discussion of the morality of the choices that may become avail­
able. There is a social dimension to the life of an individual even in 
decisions as private as medical ones. Merely mechanical observance of 
patients' self-determination easily can be a refuge from the sometimes 
painful consideration of other moral values; for example, those that 
may be associated with the family or broader community.49 The im­
48. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.05 (West Supp. 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. 
§ 459.015(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986); and WYo. STAT. § 33-26-145(d) (Supp. 1986). 
49. Callahan, supra note 12, at 41. 
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pact of conversation, discussion, and persuasion between physician 
and patient is not necessarily one-way. Just as patients are influenced 
by physicians, physicians may be influenced by patients and may gain 
insight into human nature and the complexity of moral choices. Doc­
tors may find their own views challenged and may change. 
The sequential domination of physician and patient legitimized 
by these statutes will not change fundamentally the hierarchial nature 
of doctor-patient relationships, a nature that discourages the exchange 
of relevant information. Of course, many of the living-will statutes 
explicitly encourage patient-physician conversation, but these provi­
sions alone will not offset the negative effect of the structure of the 
legislation upon the relationship. 
If the world of doctor and patient would be as silent and isolated 
as depicted, one may be skeptical that patients and doctors will suc­
cumb to the superficial attraction of conducting their relationship 
through an exchange of documents. Again, Katz's analysis of the na­
ture of the relationship between patient and physician substantiates his 
claim that relying on "the fictional propensity of physicians to discuss 
with patients is dangerous nonsense" (p. 29) and reveals why the same 
is true in the context of the living-will legislation. 
IV. THE ATTRACTION OF SILENCE 
As one aspect of the informed-consent dynamic, the decision to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment must contend with the tradition of si­
lence powerfully presented by Katz. Because these particular deci­
sions involve choices with regard to death or choices made by patients 
either facing imminent death or in contemplation of their death, the 
tradition of silence is at its strongest. Katz alludes to the difficulty 
physicians have in communicating a dire prognosis to individual pa­
tients. Although this reluctance may be based on an expressed desire 
to spare patients the distress of knowing their conditions, Katz attrib­
utes the reluctance more to the inability of the doctors themselves to 
confront the prognosis. 50 In addition, physicians may avoid informing 
the patients of the fatal nature of their condition because they believe 
such a revelation would be harmful and anti-therapeutic (p. 20). 
Doctors are not alone in refusing to speak honestly with an indi­
vidual who confronts impending death. Lawyers share this inade­
quacy and have their excuses as well. Friends and family also may 
50. Katz quotes a physician as commenting, .. It is not the patient who cannot toler­
ate hearing the truth. I could not tolerate telling my patients the truth." KATZ, supra note 
2, at 19. 
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disguise their knowledge of the patient's prognosis with false assur­
ances. If it is so common to avoid discussions of death, the execution 
of a living will by the terminally ill patient realistically cannot be ex­
pected to alter the pattern of avoiding dialogue since the necessary 
decisions have been "taken care of." 
At the same time that doctors are silent toward their patients, 
patients have been silent toward their doctors. Anyone doubting the 
existence of the patients' silence need only read any of the newspaper 
physician-columnists to see that patients frequently prefer to write the 
columnist for advice rather than ask their own doctors simple ques­
tions concerning the effect of prescribed medications or the risks and 
effectiveness of surgery their own doctors have scheduled. One expla­
nation for this may be a patient's desire to avoid imposing on a "busy" 
doctor. 
Katz offers another explanation, however, for the silence of pa­
tients toward their physicians. Katz argues that patients fear conflict 
with their physicians because "good" patients comply with doctor's 
orders while only "bad" patients question the doctor's authority.51 
Patients are afraid that if forced to justify their decisions they will lose 
control because of the doctor's greater expertise (p. 163). Rather than 
telling the doctor that they have decided to discontinue medication, 
for example, they simply do it. Accordingly, patients are likely to exe­
cute a living will and give it to a family member or lawyer to give to 
the doctor only when it is needed. 
As much as patients resent the professionalization of death, doc­
tors resent being ordered by their patients. Presentation of the living 
will, if presented as a fait accompli by the patient to the doctor, may 
itself result in the closing off of conversation and the relegation of the 
decision, along with the document, to the filing cabinet. 52 If physi­
cians and patients are already inclined to avoid conversation, institu­
tionalization of such an inadequate relationship becomes not only a 
potential outgrowth of living will legislation but unfortunately a likely 
one. 
51. A patient's feeling of being either good or bad may arise from the impact of 
transference and countertransference in physician-patient interactions. KATZ, supra note 
2, at 142-50. 
52. If all final authority is vested in patients, the danger is great that in situa­
tions of either a total refusal to give an account of one's reasons or an unwilling­
ness to explore one's possible confusion - when the need for conversation is 
greatest - doctors will wittingly and unwittingly give up on conversation and 
patients prematurely because they have been stripped of all power to stop even 
the patient's most inexplicable self-destructive course. 
KATZ, supra note 2, at 163. 
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CONCLUSION 

The traditional reluctance of patients and physicians to interact 
on an honest and reflective basis cannot be cured with the stroke of a 
pen. The temptation for lawyers is to leave the reordering of the rela­
tionship to the parties - the physicians and the patients. No doubt 
the medical profession, by changing its education and training, and the 
patients, in demanding information and taking responsibility, must 
take the lead. Katz has revealed, however, the significant, though 
often unconscious, effect of law in institutionalizing professional domi­
nation and maintaining the tradition of silence. 
Some situations governed by the living will may be beyond the 
reach of effective conversation. These include cases, such as those de­
scribed previously, in which a person with no foreseeable proximity to 
death or incapacity signs a living will to govern the unpredictable. In 
these cases, conversation between doctor and patient may have to take 
place in such an unreal context that it is ineffective to cause substantial 
reflection by either the doctor or the patient. Dialogue may result in 
the communication of relevant information, however, such as a doc­
tor's blanket refusal to comply with living wills. In light of the signifi­
cant risks of misunderstandings and indeterminacy of a living will 
executed in anticipation of unpredictable events, a proxy, designated 
by the patient while competent could assist in the interpretation of any 
document executed by the incompetent patient or could perform a 
decisionmaking function. 
With a proxy chosen by the patient, the physician, who often may 
be unfamiliar with the now-incompetent patient, has a source of im­
portant information about the patient's choices which may be more 
accurate than a simple document might reflect. The proxy also serves 
as a necessary agent who can force or encourage the doctor to admit 
and reveal that there are choices to be made. 53 
Proxy decision making has its own difficulties, of course. Families 
53. The advantages and disadvantages of proxy decisionmaking in this context are 
discussed in the following articles: Martyn & Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives/or the 
Terminally Ill: The Living Will and Durable Power 0/ Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779 
(1984); Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 985 (1984) [hereinafter Appointing an Agent]; Note, Proxy Decisionmaking for the 
Terminally Ill: The Virginia Approach, 70 VA. L. REV. 1269 (1984). Legislation on proxy­
decision making has the advantage of conforming to the custom of the medical system in 
referring treatment decisions to kith-and-kin substitutes in cases of the patients' incompe­
tency. See, e.g., Capron, In/ormed Consent to Catastrophic Disease Treatment and Re­
search, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 424-25 (1974). Because this custom is so firmly 
established in medical practice, physicians may continue to be greatly influenced by the 
kith-and-kin substitute even when he or she directly contradicts the patient's living will. 
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are not always the benign social unit of mutual support that we would 
like to assume. The well-being of the individual patient-member is not 
always the primary concern of the family; nor does the family always 
have the capability to act in a patient-centered manner. Patient-desig­
nated proxies, however, generally will be less subject to these obstacles 
and may serve as valuable participants in medical treatment 
decisionmaking. 
At the least, state legislatures should proceed to authorize proxy 
decisionmaking as an alternative to the living will. Absent such legis­
lation, attorneys may want to attempt to use the state's durable power 
of attorney statute to appoint a proxy. While this method may not be 
effective to create a proxy with authority to make medical treatment 
decisions,54 the appointment may be useful in identifying an individual 
whom the client desires to be his guardian should a guardianship be 
sought,55 or to indicate clearly that particular kith-and-kin proxies do 
not have authority to speak on his behalf. Planning of this sort is 
particularly important for the adult client who may be engaged in per­
sonal relationships not recognized as marital relationships and who 
may not want parents or other traditional proxies to control. Even in 
circumstances in which this factor is not present, there may be dispute 
among family members concerning treatment, which, in the absence of 
a designated proxy, may have to be resolved in court. 56 
In other situations, the opportunity for conversation between the 
patient and the doctor, prior or as a supplement to the execution of a 
living will, does exist. This may occur when an adult of any age has a 
condition that is potentially life-threatening. A similar situation oc­
54. The durable power of attorney, available in most states, may serve as a mecha­
nism for the appointment of a proxy decisionmaker, which appointment will survive the 
incompetency of the principal. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 486.550-.595 (Vernon Supp. 
1986). It is unclear, however, whether the principal may delegate health care decisionmak­
ing through the durable power of attorney absent an express authorization for such delega­
tion in the statute. Only a few states have legislation specifically authorizing medical 
agents for health care decisionmaking. These include among others, California (CAL. CIV. 
CODE §§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1986»; Colorado (COL. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (Supp. 
1986»; Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2501-2508 (1983»; Pennsylvania (20 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5607 (Purdon Supp. 1986»; and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 54-325.1:1-8:12 (1986». These statutes are subject to some of the same deficiencies as 
living-will legislation insofar as they attempt to limit the effectiveness of the appointment to 
situations in which the principal is terminally ill. 
55. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 475.050 (Vernon Supp. 1986), which provides that 
"the court shall consider the suitability of appointing ... [a]ny eligible person ... nomi­
nated in an instrument in writing signed at [the incompetent person's] request, before the 
inception of his incapacity or disability, at a time within five years before the hearing when 
he was able to make and communicate a reasonable choice." 
56. See Appointing an Agent, supra note 53, at 994-95. 
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curs in the case of an elderly individual who may be subject to condi­
tions that threaten severe physical or mental deterioration. At this 
stage, if the patient is aware of this diagnosis, conversation between 
the patient and doctor concerning the choices available can be quite 
beneficial to the patient's well-being. Conversation between doctor 
and patient would also tend to reveal the doctor's view of his or her 
own role in caring for the terminally ill patient. This would allow the 
patient to learn of conflicts that are best resolved prior to the patient's 
incompetency, perhaps by engaging a different doctor. 
The ability of law alone to encourage such conversation is lim­
ited. One opportunity that does exist, even within the structure of the 
living-will statutes, is that afforded the courts interpreting those stat­
utes. A physician's determination of whether the patient meets the 
preconditions for the operation of the living will should be based on 
the patient's expressed choice, if known. Giving patients a role in the 
determination of the existence of the preconditions would encourage 
patients to contact their doctors and let their desires be known rather 
than allow the doctors to make these decisions on their behalf or re­
quire the courts to intervene. In situations in which a particular 
course is likely, the patient may execute a living will that more explic­
itly defines the preconditions required. This is especially critical in 
light of the uncertainty in diagnoses of terminal illness, the ambiguity 
of the term, and the lack of a defined purpose for the terminal illness 
boundary. 
Lawyers will playa significant role in the implementation of the 
living will because many clients will request that they execute this doc­
ument. In this task, the lawyer should not always simply resort to use 
of the statutory form. Rather, the lawyer must advise the client of the 
limitations of the document and encourage discussion between patient 
and doctor. There are many reasons for this advice, including the role 
of the doctor in determining the preconditions that trigger the docu­
ment and the implementation of added clauses, such as refusals of 
medically provided nutrition. In addition, if the client's doctor refuses 
to comply with living wills because of the doctor's own ethical beliefs, 
the client should be made aware of this while the opportunity to 
choose a different doctor still exists. Moreover, if the client's family 
opposes the client's living will, the physician and lawyer can be the 
patient's allies, with the living will serving as evidence of the mutual 
consent among them. Of course, lawyers have to devise a cost-efficient 
manner of communicating this information. In this regard, while law­
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yers push doctors to take the time to inform patients fully, we might 
do well to follow our own prescription. 
Finally, neither the courts nor the legislatures should consider 
their task complete merely because of the recognition of the living will. 
Clearly, the courts will continue to be involved in this area in inter­
preting the statutes and in dealing with situations not covered by the 
living-will legislation. In light of the deficiencies of living wills, the 
courts should not establish policies that implicitly require that patients 
sign living wills as the only effective method through which their 
choices will be honored. Nor should they limit the scope of individual 
choice to that set by the legislature in the living will. 
At the bottom line, patients must have final authority to make the 
decisions concerning their medical treatment. But the nature of the 
process for reaching this bottom line is important for the quality of life 
of the patient and the physician. Katz concedes that his call for the 
enhancement of autonomy through conversation is paternalistic (p. 
128). The same can be said about criticisms of living-will legislation 
based on a belief that its mechanical form will have a negative impact 
on the relationship of physicians and patients. Acknowledging that 
the call to conversation is paternalistic, however, is not to concede that 
this paternalism destroys the individual's autonomy, as may indeed be 
the case in other conflicts. Rather, the insistence on conversation as 
an element of the process of autonomy may equally be characterized 
as creating an environment for the exercise of autonomy. The legal 
doctrine of informed consent focuses not solely upon consent, but 
rather upon decisionmaking, whether consent or refusal, and upon the 
communication of relevant information to the patient for careful con­
sideration. There is a critical link between information and a particu­
lar treatment decision. It is this link that the living will totally 
abandons. Without that interaction, patients will make decisions to 
refuse or to demand medical treatment in a vacuum deprived of neces­
sary information (p. 209). 
The call to conversation in the face of the history of silence is one 
that undoubtedly will be met with a healthy skepticism. 57 It is cer­
tainly idealistic to create a duty of reflection and dialogue while simul­
57. The tradition of silence has severely undermined patients' trust of physicians in a 
quiet way that erupts during conflicts such as these. Katz quotes Richard C. Cabot, a 
physician: 
We think we can isolate a lie as we do a case of smallpox, and let its effect die with 
the occasion that brought it about. But is it not common experience that such 
custorr..S are infectious and spread far beyond our intention and beyond our con­
trol? They beget, as a rule, not any acute indignation among those who get wind 
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taneously calling physicians and patients to a new level of 
conversation. One may argue that individual control should not be 
sacrificed in favor of an idealized relationship. Nor should the individ­
ual be sacrificed, however, to an empty notion of autonomy that brings 
with it isolation and abandonment and which can be "undermined by 
hopeful promises, blind misconceptions, and false certainties" (p. 141). 
of them (for 'how,' they say, 'could the doctor do otherwise'), but rather a quiet, 
chronic incredibility which is stubborn. 
KATZ, supra note 2, at 25. 
